The early Platonic concept of the soul and Plutarch’s De animae procreatione in Timaeo by Opsomer, Jan
The early Platonic concept of the soul and Plutarch’s De animae 
procreatione in Timaeo 
Jan Opsomer, University of Leuven (Internal Research Funds) 
 
T 1 τῆς ἀµεροῦς καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώµατα γιγνοµένης µεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ 
ἀµφοῖν ἐν µέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταὐτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου· καὶ κατὰ 
ταῦτα συνέστησεν ἐν µέσῳ τοῦ τ' ἀµεροῦς αὐτὴν [αὐτῶν: Plato mss.] καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώµατα µεριστοῦ. καὶ 
τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς µίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσµικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸ 
συναρµόττων βίᾳ· µιγνὺς δὲ µετὰ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάµενος ἕν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο µοίρας εἰς ἃς 
προσῆκε διένειµεν, ἑκάστην δὲ τούτων ἔκ τε ταὐτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας µεµιγµένην· ἤρχετο δὲ 
διαιρεῖν ὧδε. 
 Of the indivisible and ever invariable being and of the divisible on the other hand that comes to pass 
in the case of bodies he blended together out of both a third kind of being in the middle, and in regard 
to the nature of sameness again and that of difference he also in this way compounded it in the 
middle of the indivisible and what is divisible among bodies. And he took them, three as they were, 
and blended them all together into a single entity, forcibly fitting into sameness the nature of 
difference, which is refractory to mixture, and mixing them together with being. (trans. H. Cherniss) 
T 2 Ar. DA I.2, 404b16-30: (a) τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιµαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ· 
γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁµοίῳ τὸ ὅµοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγµατα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. (b) ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ 
φιλοσοφίας λεγοµένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ µὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου µήκους καὶ 
πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ὁµοιοτρόπως· (c) ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, (c1) νοῦν µὲν τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήµην δὲ τὰ δύο 
(µοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ' ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθµὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. (c2) οἱ µὲν γὰρ 
ἀριθµοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγµατα τὰ µὲν νῷ, τὰ 
δ' ἐπιστήµῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ' αἰσθήσει· (c3) εἴδη δ' οἱ ἀριθµοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγµάτων. (d) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν 
ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀµφοῖν, ἀποφηνάµενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθµὸν 
κινοῦνθ' ἑαυτόν. 
  (a) In the same manner [sc. as Empedocles] Plato in the Timaeus constructs the soul from the 
elements; for like, he holds, is known by like, and things are formed out of the principles. (b) Similarly 
also in the lectures ‘On Philosophy’ it was determined that the Animal-itself is compounded of the 
Form itself of the One together with the primary length, breadth, and depth, the other 
[things/animals] being similarly constituted. (c) And in yet another way: (c1) One is intelligence, Two 
is knowledge (because it goes to one point in a single way), the number of the plane is opinion, the 
number of the solid sensation; (c2) for the numbers use to be identified with the Forms themselves 
or principles, and are formed out of the elements; and some things are apprehended by intelligence, 
others by knowledge, others by opinion, others by sensation; (c3) and these same numbers are the 
forms of things. (d) And since the soul was deemed to be originative of both motion and, in this way, 
of cognition, some thinkers, entwining both aspects, have declared the soul to be a number moving 
itself. 
T 3 Aet. I.3, Ps.-Plut. 877A, DG 282a5-17: διὸ καὶ ἐφθέγγοντο οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, ὡς µεγίστου ὅρκου ὄντος τῆς 
τετράδος, ‘οὐ µὰ τὸν ἁµετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν,’ […] ‘καὶ ἡ ἡµετέρα ψυχή’ φησίν ‘ἐκ τετράδος 
σύγκειται·’ εἶναι γὰρ νοῦν ἐπιστήµην δόξαν αἴσθησιν, ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήµη καὶ αὐτοὶ λογικοί 
ἐσµεν. νοῦς µὲν οὖν ἡ µονάς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κατὰ µονάδα θεωρεῖται, κτλ. 
 That is why the Pythagoreans used to invoke the tetractys as their most binding oath: «By him who 
gave the tetractys to our soul, etc. […].» «And our soul, he says, consists of the tetactys. For it is 
intellect, knowledge, opinion, sensation, the sources of every art and knowledge and of our 
rationaility. It is the monad which is intellect. For intellect is thought of in accordance with the 
monad, etc.»  
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1) Part I: Composition of the soul (1012C-1017C; 1022E-1027A) 
a) Xenocrates (1012D2-F1): definition of soul, based on Tim. 35A: number + motion 
(agreement with Zaratas, teacher of Pythagoras, concerning the dyad) 
b) Crantor (1012D1-8, 1012F2-1013A5): definition of soul, based on Tim. 35A: cognition of 
intelligible/sensible, in each case discerning identity and difference 
c) Xenocrates and Crantor reject the temporal origin of the soul (1013A6-11). 
d) Eudorus claims that Xenocrates and Crantor are probably right in rejecting the soul’s temporal 
origin (1013B5-9). 
e) ‘Most students of Plato’ (1013D12-E1) believe the world to be sempiternal (a parte ante). 
f) Those who identify matter with ‘necessity’ and ‘measurelessness’ (1014E9-F1). 
g) Eudemus’ misguided criticism of Plato’s theory of matter as the principle of evil (1015D7-10). 
h) Posidonius (1023B5-C11) 
i) Xenocrates (?) and Posidonius (1023C11-D2) 
j) Interpreters who criticise Plato’s characterisation of ‘difference’ as ‘refractory to mixture’ (1023D3-
10). 
2) Part II: harmonic division of the soul (1027A-1027F, 1017C-1022E; 1027F-1030C) 
a) Quantity of the numbers used 
i) Some think it is fine to multiply the original numbers (1027D9) 
ii) Eudorus following Crantor (are these two the ‘some’ mentioned above?) starts from the 
number 384 (1020C2-7; 1020D6-7). 
iii) Eudorus’ method for calculating the means (1019E) 
iv) leimma:  
(1) ‘the customary treatments in the Pythagorean texts/schools’ (1020E2-4) 
(2) ‘others’ (1022A6) 
b) Arrangement of the numbers used by Plato 
i) Theodorus of Soli (1027D1-5; Theodorus is also discussed at De def. or. 427A-E) 
ii) Crantor, Clearchus [1022C8-11] 
c) Use of the numbers 
i) Various anonymous interpreters, geometers (1028A9-B4; these are familiar with the 
astronomy of Hipparchus) 
ii) Pythagoreans (1028A4-5; C2-3) 
iii) Chaldeans (1028E11-F2 – a view attributed to the Pythagoreans by Aristides Quintilianus, De 
mus. 3.19) 
iv) ‘some’ (not identical with the aforementioned Pythagoreans) (1029A5-6; cf. 1028C) 
 
 
T 4 1012D2-8: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δοκιµωτάτων ἀνδρῶν τοὺς µὲν Ξενοκράτης προσηγάγετο, τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν 
ἀριθµὸν αὐτὸν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κινούµενον ἀποφηνάµενος, οἱ δὲ Κράντορι τῷ Σολεῖ προσέθεντο, µιγνύντι τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἔκ τε τῆς νοητῆς καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ δοξαστῆς φύσεως, οἶµαί τι τὴν τούτων ἀνακαλυφθέντων 
σαφήνειαν ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιµον ἡµῖν παρέξειν. 
 Since, however, of the men most highly esteemed some were won over by Xenocrates, who declared 
the soul’s essence to be number itself being moved by itself, and others adhered to Crantor of Soli, 
who makes the soul a mixture of the intelligible nature and of the opinable nature of perceptible 
things, I think that the clarification of these two when exposed will afford us something like a 
keynote. 
T 5 1012D9-F1: οἱ µὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθµοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νοµίζουσι τῇ µίξει τῆς ἀµερίστου καὶ µεριστῆς 
οὐσίας· ἀµέριστον µὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν µεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἀριθµὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς 
ὁρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον (καὶ Ζαράτας ὁ 
Πυθαγόρου διδάσκαλος ταύτην µὲν ἐκάλει τοῦ ἀριθµοῦ µητέρα τὸ δ' ἓν πατέρα· διὸ καὶ βελτίονας εἶναι τῶν 
ἀριθµῶν ὅσοι τῇ µονάδι προσεοίκασι)· τοῦτον δὲ µήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθµὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ 
κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ. τοῦ δὲ ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συµµιγέντων, ὧν τὸ µέν ἐστι κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ 
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µεταβολῆς τὸ δὲ µονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγονέναι, µηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ἱστάναι καὶ ἵστασθαι δύναµιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ 
κινεῖν οὖσαν. 
 The former [i.e. Xenocrates and his followers] believe that nothing but the generation of number is 
signified by the mixture of the indivisible and divisible being, the one being indivisible and 
multiplicity divisible and number being the product of these when the one bounds multiplicity and 
inserts a limit in infinitude, which they call indefinite dyad too (this Zaratas too, the teacher of 
Pythagoras, called mother of number; and the one he called father, which is also why he held those 
numbers to be better that resemble the monad); but they believe that this number is not yet soul, for 
it lacks motivity and mobility, but that after the commingling of sameness and difference, the latter 
of which is the principle of motion and change while the former is that of rest, then the product is 
soul, soul being a faculty of bringing to a stop and being at rest no less than of being in motion and 
setting in motion. 
T 6 1012F2-1013A5: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα µάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαµβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τά 
τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τάς τε τούτων ἐν αὑτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γιγνοµένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁµοιότητας, ἐκ 
πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γιγνώσκῃ, συγκεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν· | ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν 
ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώµατα παθητικὴν καὶ µεταβλητήν, ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταὐτοῦ 
καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου διὰ τὸ κἀκείνων ἑκατέραν µετέχειν ἑτερότητος καὶ ταὐτότητος. 
 Crantor and his followers, on the other hand, supposing that the soul's peculiar function is above all 
to form judgments of the intelligible and the perceptible objects and the differences and similarities 
occurring among these objects both within their own kind and in relation of either kind to the other, 
say that the soul, in order that it may know all, has been blended together out of all and that these 
are four, the intelligible nature, which is ever invariable and identical, and the passive and mutable 
nature of bodies and furthermore that of sameness and of difference because each of the former two 
also partakes of diversity and identity. 
T 7 Procl. in Tim. III, 2.152.21-30: ἐκ ταύτης δ’ οὖν καὶ τῆς ἀµερίστου τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, διότι µέση τῶν τε πάντη 
σωµάτων ἐξῃρηµένων ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν κεχυµένων εἰς τὰ σώµατα, καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
γεγονότων, αὐτήν τε ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἄλλων οὖσαν. οὐκ ἄρα ἀνεξόµεθα λέγειν ἡµεῖς οὕτω µέσην αὐτήν, ὡς 
ἔχουσάν τι καὶ ἀσώµατον καὶ σωµατικόν, ὡς Ἐρατοσθένης ὑπέλαβεν, ἢ διάστηµα γεωµετρικὸν ἐπὶ τὴν 
οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἀναφέρειν, ὡς Σευῆρος· κρᾶσις γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἀδιαστάτου καὶ διαστατοῦ καὶ 
ἀµερίστου καὶ σώµατος· οὐδ`γὰρ σηµείου καὶ γραµµῆς. 
 In any case, it is from this [sc. the visible sort of Being] and from the indivisible that the soul exists, 
because it is a mean between what is entirely transcendent of bodies and what is distributed in 
bodies, as well as between what is in and of itself and what has come to be in relation to something 
else – the soul being itself something that is both in and of itself, as well as in relation to another. We 
must not uphold that view that the  soul is intermediate in the sense that it possesses something both 
corporeal and incorporeal, as Eratosthenes supposed. Nor should we compare its Being to 
‘geometrical extension’ as Severus does, for there could never be a mixture of the extended and the 
unextended, nor a mixture of the indivisible and the corporeal, any more than there could be a 
mixture of a point and a line. (trans. Baltzly)  
T 8 Iambl. DA ap. Stob. 1.378.6-7 W.: Ἄλλη τοίνυν αἵρεσις τῶν Πλατωνικῶν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς δηµιουργικοὺς 
κλήρους, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὰς διαιρέσεις τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν οἷον θεῶν, ἀγγέλων, δαιµόνων, ἡρώων, οὐδὲ κατὰ 
τὰς νοµὰς τοῦ παντὸς διακρίνει τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν διαφερόντων τόπων καταβάσεις τῶν ψυχῶν· τιθεµένη δὲ τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι ἐν σώµατι, ὥσπερ ἡ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ Πτολεµαίου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ καὶ ἄλλων, ἀπὸ 
σωµάτων αὐτὴν λεπτοτέρων εἰς τὰ ὀστρεώδη πάλιν εἰσοικίζει σώµατα· διατρίβειν µὲν γὰρ αὐτὴν εἰς µοῖράν 
τινα τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, καθήκειν γε µὴν εἰς τὸ στερεὸν σῶµα ἄλλοτε ἀπ' ἄλλων τοῦ παντὸς τόπων.  Καὶ τούτους 
Ἡρακλείδην µὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζειν περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, 
ἀφ' ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχάς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν 
καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωµάτων ἀεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα 
σώµατα διισχυρίζεσθαι. 
 Another set of Platonists does not make this distinction that the descents of souls occur from 
different places according to the allotments of the Demiurge, according to the divisions of the 
superior classes (as for example, gods, angels, daemons, and heroes), and according to the 
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distributions in the universe. Rather they posit that the soul is always in a body (as Eratosthenes, 
Ptolemy the Platonist, and others do) and make it pass from subtler bodies into dense bodies. For, 
they assert, the soul spends time in some portion of the sensible world, and descends into solid body 
at different times from different places in the universe. These places from which the souls descend 
here Heraclides of Pontus locates around the Milky Way; others throughout all the heavenly spheres. 
Some say that souls dwell around the moon or in the air under the moon and that they descend from 
there into earthly creation, while others firmly maintain that they always fall from solid bodies into 
other [solid] bodies. The various descents into this realm take place from so many and such different 
places, and the manner [of these descents] also differs in many ways. (trans. Finamore/Dillon) 
T 9 Aet. IV.2.3 (Stobaeus, ps.-Plutarch) = DG386b8-10 (386a12-14): Πυθαγόρας ἀριθµὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, τὸν 
δ’ ἀριθµὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ νοῦ παραλαµβάνει. 
 Pythagoras [says the soul is] self-moving number, taking number to stand for intellect.  
T 10 Quaest. Plat. VIII, 1007c5-6: καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς ‘ἀριθµὸς ἦν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν’ 
 In fact, the ancients even held that the essence of soul is number moving itself. 
T 11 1022F7-1023A1: οἱ δὲ σωµατικὴν ἀξιοῦντες ὕλην συµµίγνυσθαι τῇ ἀµερίστῳ διαµαρτάνουσι· 
 But those who maintain that corporeal matter is mixed with the indivisible being are utterly 
mistaken. 
T 12 1023B5-D2: (a) Ὅµοια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ποσειδώνιον· οὐ γὰρ µακρὰν τῆς ὕλης 
ἀπέστησαν· (b) ἀλλὰ δεξάµενοι τὴν τῶν περάτων οὐσίαν περὶ τὰ σώµατα λέγεσθαι µεριστὴν καὶ ταῦτα τῷ 
νοητῷ µίξαντες (c) ἀπεφήναντο τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ κατ'ἀριθµὸν συνεστῶσαν 
ἁρµονίαν περιέχοντα· (d) τά τε γὰρ µαθηµατικὰ τῶν πρώτων νοητῶν µεταξὺ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τετάχθαι, 
τῆς τε ψυχῆς, τῶν νοητῶν τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ παθητικὸν ἐχούσης, προσῆκον ἐν µέσῳ τὴν οὐσίαν 
ὑπάρχειν. (e) ἔλαθε γὰρ καὶ τούτους ὁ θεὸς τοῖς τῶν σωµάτων πέρασιν ὕστερον, ἀπειργασµένης ἤδη τῆς 
ψυχῆς, χρώµενος ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ὕλης διαµόρφωσιν, τὸ σκεδαστὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἀσύνδετον ὁρίζων καὶ 
περιλαµβάνων ταῖς ἐκ τῶν τριγώνων συναρµοττοµένων ἐπιφανείαις. (f) ἀτοπώτερον δὲ τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν 
ποιεῖν· ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἀεικίνητος ἡ δ' ἀκίνητος, καὶ ἡ µὲν ἀµιγὴς πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἡ δὲ τῷ σώµατι συνειργµένη. 
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ θεὸς τῆς µὲν ἰδέας ὡς παραδείγµατος γέγονε µιµητής, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ἀποτελέσµατος 
δηµιουργός. (g) ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἀριθµὸν ὁ Πλάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τίθεται τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ ταττοµένην ὑπ' ἀριθµοῦ, 
προείρηται. 
 (a) We can make similar objections to Posidonius cum suis. Indeed, they did not observe a great 
distance from matter, (b) but rather, having taken ‘the divisible in the presence of bodies’ to mean 
the being of the limits and having blended these limits with the intelligible, (c) they declared the soul 
to be the form of what is everyway extended, constituted according to number that comprehends 
harmony. (d) This is based on the idea that the mathematicals are situated between the primary 
intelligibles and the sense-perceptibles and that it is appropriate that the soul, which possesses the 
everlastingness of intelligibles and the passivity of perceptibles, has its being in the middle. (e) For 
these people, too, failed to notice that god uses the limits of bodies only at a later stage, when he had 
already completed the production of the soul: by means of them he provides internal structure to 
matter, by demarcating and enclosing its dispersiveness and unboundedness with the surfaces made 
of the triangles fitted together. (f) What is more absurd, however, is to make the soul a Form: for 
whereas soul is always in motion, Form is immobile; whereas Form does not mix with the sense-
perceptible, soul is conjoined with the body; in addition, god’s relation to Form has become that of 
the imitator of a paradigm,  whereas his relation to soul is like that of artisan to finished product. (g) 
And that Plato does not make number the being of soul, but rather presents the soul as being ordered 
by number: that we have explained earlier. 
T 13 DL 7.157 (Posidonius F 139 E/K): Ζήνων δ' ὁ Κιτιεὺς καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος 
πνεῦµα ἔνθερµον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἡµᾶς εἶναι ἔµπνους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι. 
 Zeno of Citium [SVF, 1.135] and Antipater in his On Soul and Posidonius say that soul is warm breath, 
for it is by this that we have the breath of life in us, and by its agency we move. (trans. E. Kidd) 
T 14 Diogenes Laertius 3.67: Τὰ δὲ ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἦν. Ἀθάνατον ἔλεγε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ πολλὰ 
µεταµφιεννυµένην σώµατα, ἀρχήν τε ἔχειν ἀριθµητικήν, τὸ δὲ σῶµα γεωµετρικήν· ὡρίζετο δὲ αὐτὴν ἰδέαν 
τοῦ πάντῃ διεστῶτος πνεύµατος.  
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 The doctrines he approved are these. He held that the soul is immortal, that by transmigration it puts 
on many bodies, and that it has a numerical first principle, whereas the first principle of the body is 
geometrical; and he defined soul as the idea of vital breath diffused in all directions. (trans. R.D. 
Hicks) 
T 15 Sext. Emp. AM 7.93-94: καὶ ὡς τὸ µὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίµαιον ἐξηγούµενος, ὑπὸ 
τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαµβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις 
ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαµβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. ἦν δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ὑποστάσεως ἀριθµός. διὸ καὶ 
ὁ κριτὴς τῶν πάντων λόγος οὐκ ἀµέτοχος ὢν τῆς τούτου δυνάµεως καλοῖτο ἂν ἀριθµός. καὶ τοῦτο 
ἐµφαίνοντες οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ ποτὲ µὲν εἰώθασι λέγειν τὸ ἀριθµῷ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν, ὁτὲ δὲ κτλ. 
 And, as Posidonius says in expounding Plato’s Timaeus, “Just as light is apprehended by sight, which 
is luminous, and sound by hearing, which is airy, so too the nature of the whole ought to be 
apprehended by something akin to it, namely reason.” But the starting-point in the constitution of 
the whole is number. And this means that reason, the judge of all things, could also be called number, 
since it is not without a share in its power. (94) And in pointing this out the Pythagoreans are 
sometimes in the habit of saying everything is like number. (trans. R. Bett)  
T 16 Sext. Emp. AM 7.119: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῷ Τιµαίῳ πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ ἀσώµατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ αὐτῷ 
γένει τῆς ἀποδείξεως κέχρηται. εἰ γὰρ ἡ µὲν ὅρασις, φησί, φωτὸς ἀντιλαµβανοµένη εὐθύς ἐστι φωτοειδής, ἡ 
δὲ ἀκοὴ ἀέρα πεπληγµένον κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν φωνήν, εὐθὺς ἀεροειδὴς θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἀτµοὺς 
γνωρίζουσα πάντως ἐστὶν ἀτµοειδὴς καὶ ἡ γεῦσις χυλοὺς χυλοειδής, κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωµάτους 
ἰδέας λαµβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν ἀριθµοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν σωµάτων, γίνεταί τις ἀσώµατος. 
 But Plato in the Timaeus uses the same type of demonstration for the purpose of demonstrating the 
fact that the soul is incorporeal. For, he says, if sight in apprehending light is right away luminous, 
and hearing, in discerning air being struck (which is sound), is right away observed to be airy, and 
smell in picking up vapors is definitely vaporous, and taste in picking up flavors is flavor-like, then 
necessarily the soul too, in grasping the incorporeal ideas, such as those in numbers and those in the 
limits of bodies, becomes an incorporeal sort of thing. (trans. R. Bett)  
T 17 Achilles, Intr. in Ar. 13 (= Posid. F149, partim): Ποσειδώνιος δὲ ἀγνοεῖν τοὺς Ἐπικουρείους ἔφη, ὡς οὐ τὰ 
σώµατα τὰς ψυχὰς συνέχει, ἀλλ' αἱ ψυχαὶ τὰ σώµατα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ κόλλα καὶ ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς κρατεῖ. 
 Posidonius said that the Epicureans do not know that it is not bodies which hold souls together, but 
souls bodies, just as glue controls both itself and what is outside it. (trans. Kidd)  
T 18 Iambl. De an. 4 (Finamore-Dillon) / 7 (Martone), ap. Stob. Ecl. I.49, p. 363.26-364.7 Wachsmuth: Μετὰ 
δὴ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰς µαθηµατικὴν οὐσίαν ἐντιθέντας τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταλέγω διευκρινηµένως. Ἔστι δὴ 
γένος ἕν τι αὐτῆς τὸ σχῆµα, πέρας ὂν διαστάσεως, καὶ αὐτὴ <ἡ> διάστασις. Ἐν αὐτοῖς µὲν οὖν τούτοις 
Σεβῆρος ὁ Πλατωνικὸς αὐτὴν ἀφωρίσατο, ἐν ἰδέᾳ δὲ τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ Σπεύσιππος· ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ ἤτοι 
ἑνώσει τούτων ἄλλος ἄν τις καθαρώτερον αὐτὴν προστήσαιτο τελεώτατα.  
 Πάλιν τοίνυν ὁ ἀριθµὸς ἐν ἑτέρῳ γένει κεῖται. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτον ἁπλῶς µὲν οὕτως ἔνιοι τῶν Πυθαγορείων τῇ 
ψυχῇ συναρµόζουσιν· ὡς δ' αὐτοκίνητον Ξενοκράτης, ὡς δὲ λόγους περιεχούσῃ Μοδέρατος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος, 
ὡς δὲ κριτικὸν κοσµουργοῦ θεοῦ ὄργανον Ἵππασος, ὁ ἀκουσµατικὸς τῶν Πυθαγορείων· ὡς δ' Ἀριστοτέλης 
ἱστορεῖ, Πλάτων ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου µήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους αὐτὸ τὸ ζῷον 
προϋποτιθέµενος καὶ τὸ µὲν ἓν νοῦν, τὴν δὲ δυάδα ἐπιστήµην, δόξαν δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθµόν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ 
στερεοῦ [τὴν] αἴσθησιν διοριζόµενος. 
 Next, I propose to list carefully those who relate the essence of the soul with mathematical essence. 
Of this the first kind is figure, which is the limit of extension, and extension itself. In these very terms 
it was defined by Severus the Platonist, while Speusippus defined it as “the form of the omni-
dimensionally extended.” One might, however, employing a purer definition, define it most perfectly 
as the cause, or rather the unity, prior to these two. Number, again, constitutes a second kind [of 
mathematical essence], and indeed some of the Pythagoreans apply it to the soul simply as such; 
Xenocrates [applies it] as self-moved; Moderatus the Pythagorean, as comprising ratios; Hippasus 
the Pythagorean auditor, as being the instrument by which the god who creates the world measures. 
As Aristotle relates, Plato [constructs the soul] by premising that the Essential Living Being is made 
up of the idea of the one and of the primary length <and breadth> and depth, and defining the one 
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as intellect, the dyad as scientific knowledge, the number of the plane, opinion, and sense-perception 
the number of the solid. (trans. J. Finamore - J. Dillon)  
T 19 Timaeus Locrus 208.13-209.1: Τὰν δὲ τῶ κόσµω ψυχὰν µεσόθεν ἐξάψας ἐπάγαγεν, ἔξω περικαλύψας αὐτὸν 
ὅλον αὐτᾷ, κρᾶµα αὐτὰν κερασάµενος ἔκ τε τᾶς ἀµερίστω µορφᾶς καὶ τᾶς µεριστᾶς οὐσίας, ὡς ἓν κρᾶµα ἐκ 
δύο τουτέων εἶµεν. ᾧ ποτέµιξε δύο δυνάµιας ἀρχὰς κινασίων, τᾶς τε ταὐτῶ καὶ τᾶς τῶ ἑτέρω· ἃ δὴ καὶ 
δύσµικτος ἔασσα οὐκ ἐκ τῶ ῥᾴστω συνεκίρνατο. λόγοι δ' οἵδε πάντες ἐντὶ κατ' ἀριθµὼς ἁρµονικὼς 
συγκεκραµένοι. ὣς λόγως κατὰ µοῖραν διαιρήκει ποτ' ἐπιστάµαν, ὡς µὴ ἀγνοῆν ἐξ ὧν ἁ ψυχὰ καὶ δι' ὧν 
συνέστακεν. 
T 20 Timaeus Locrus 206.3-4: τὰν δὲ περὶ τὰ σώµατα µεριστὰν εἶµεν καὶ τᾶς θατέρω φύσιος 
 Plut. De an. procr. 1025B3-6: συνήγαγεν οὐ δι' αὑτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐσίας ἑτέρας µεταξύ, τὴν µὲν ἀµέριστον πρὸ 
τοῦ ταὐτοῦ πρὸ δὲ τοῦ θατέρου τὴν µεριστήν, ἔστιν ᾗ προσήκουσαν ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρᾳ τάξας. Ηe united 
<sameness and difference>, not just by themselves; but by first interposing other beings, the 
indivisible in front of sameness and in front of difference the divisible, as each of the one pair is in a 
way akin to one of the other.  
 1024D9-11: ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς κάτεισι, τὸ µὲν ταὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ δὲ θάτερον ἀπὸ τῆς 
δυάδος.  In fact, each of the two derives from another of two principles, sameness from the one and 
difference from the dyad. 
T 21 Timaeus Locrus 216.20-21: τὸ δὲ δωδεκάεδρον εἰκόνα τῶ παντὸς ἐστάσατο, ἔγγιστα σφαίρᾳ ἐόν.  
 Plut., Quaest. Plat. V, 1003C8-9: Πότερον, ὡς ὑπονοοῦσιν ἔνιοι, τὸ δωδεκάεδρον τῷ σφαιροειδεῖ προσένειµεν;  
T 22 Plat. Tim. 67B2-4: ὅλως µὲν οὖν φωνὴν θῶµεν τὴν δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος ἐγκεφάλου τε καὶ αἵµατος µέχρι ψυχῆς 
πληγὴν διαδιδοµένην 
T 23 Timaeus Locrus 220.4-5: Φωνὰ δ' ἐστὶ µὲν πλᾶξις ἐν ἀέρι διικνουµένα ποτὶ τὰν ψυχὰν δι' ὤτων 
T 24 Plut. Quaest. Plat. VII, 1005B4-5: ἔστι γὰρ ἡ φωνὴ πληγὴ τοῦ αἰσθανοµένου δι' ὤτων ὑπ' ἀέρος· 
 Sound, in fact, is the impact made by air through the ears upon the percipient. 
T 25 Plat. Tim. 79E10-80A4: Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἰατρικὰς σικύας παθηµάτων αἴτια καὶ τὰ τῆς καταπόσεως 
τά τε τῶν ῥιπτουµένων, ὅσα ἀφεθέντα µετέωρα καὶ ὅσα ἐπὶ γῆς φέρεται, ταύτῃ διωκτέον, καὶ ὅσοι φθόγγοι 
ταχεῖς τε καὶ βραδεῖς ὀξεῖς τε καὶ βαρεῖς φαίνονται 
 80B8-C3: καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ τῶν ὑδάτων πάντα ῥεύµατα, ἔτι δὲ τὰ τῶν κεραυνῶν πτώµατα καὶ τὰ θαυµαζόµενα 
ἠλέκτρων περὶ τῆς ἕλξεως καὶ τῶν Ἡρακλείων λίθων, πάντων τούτων ὁλκὴ µὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδενί ποτε κτλ. 
T 26 Timaeus Locrus 221.1-7: ἁ γὰρ σικύα καὶ τὸ ἤλεκτρον εἰκόνες ἀναπνοᾶς ἐντι. […] ἁ δὲ σικύα ἀπαναλωθέντος 
ὑπὸ τῶ πυρὸς τῶ ἀέρος ἐφέλκεται τὸ ὑγρόν, τὸ δ' ἤλεκτρον ἐκκριθέντος τῶ πνεύµατος ἀναλαµβάνει † τὸ 
ὅµοιον σῶµα 
T 27 Plut. Quaest. Plat. VII, 1004E11-1005A3: Πρῶτον µὲν οὖν τὸ περὶ τὴν σικύαν τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· ὁ περιληφθεὶς 
ὑπ' αὐτῆς πρὸς τῇ σαρκὶ µετὰ θερµότητος ἀὴρ ἐκπυρωθεὶς καὶ γενόµενος τῶν τοῦ χαλκοῦ πόρων ἀραιότερος 
ἐξέπεσεν οὐκ εἰς κενὴν χώραν, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰς δὲ τὸν περιεστῶτα τὴν σικύαν ἔξωθεν ἀέρα, κἀκεῖνον 
ἀπέωσεν· ὁ δὲ τὸν πρὸ αὑτοῦ· καὶ τοῦτο πάσχων ἀεὶ καὶ δρῶν ὁ ἔµπροσθεν ὑποχωρεῖ, τῆς κενουµένης 
γλιχόµενος χώρας, ἣν ὁ πρῶτος ἐξέλιπεν· | οὕτω δὲ τῇ σαρκὶ περιπίπτων, ἧς ἡ σικύα δέδρακται, καὶ ἀναζέων 
ἅµα συνεκθλίβει τὸ ὑγρὸν εἰς τὴν σικύαν. 
 1005B6-C2: Τὸ δ' ἤλεκτρον οὐδὲν ἕλκει τῶν παρακειµένων […] ἀλλ' ἡ µὲν λίθος τινὰς ἀπορροίας ἐξίησιν 
ἐµβριθεῖς καὶ πνευµατώδεις […] τὸ δ' ἤλεκτρον ἔχει µέν τι φλογοειδὲς ἢ πνευµατικόν. 
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